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Interpleader possesses on first acquaintance an attractiveness which
is not exceeded by any other remedy known to the law. "The mere
"statement of the principle," declared Sir James Willes,' "shows its
"jujstice." As a quick and simple way out of a complex situation, it
has an intellectual fascination like the vx method for solving simul-
taneous quadratic equations. Upon further study of 'the cases, how-
ever, the lawyer's mental reaction changes to intense exasperation.
Nowhere else, perhaps, can he encounter technicalities equal to those
which hem in this admirable remedy. It is the purpose of this article
to examine the most important of the restrictions on the general prin-
ciple of interpleader, and consider how far they can properly be
removed and how much some legislative efforts to accomplish this
result have already succeeded. Here, as so often in the discussion of
legal reforms, we have to discriminate between the accidental and the
permanent, between limitations on judicial powers which are purely
historical or arbitrary and those which are inherently desirable and
cannot be discarded without causing grave injustice.2
The general principle of interpleader is simple and clear. Where
two persons are engaged in a dispute, and that which is to be the fruit
of the dispute is in the hands of a third party who occupies the posi-
tion of a stakeholder and is willing to give up the stakes according to
the result of the dispute, then if that stakeholder is sued or threatened
with suit, he is not obliged to be'at the expense and risk bf defending
two actions; but, on giving up the thing in dispute, he is to be relieved,
and the court directs that the persons between whom the dispute really
exists shall fight it out at their own expense.3 The principle may be
illustrated by some situations where it is well settled that interpleader
will be granted. In these cases, and throughout the article, instead of
such ambiguous terms as plaintiff and defendant, the same person
'Evans v. Wright (x865) 13 W. R. 468.
'The study of equitable remedies has the advantage which Girard describes
in the study of the history of Roman law: "I1 n'y en a pas qui puisse plus
sfirement former non pas seulement des homnmes de m6tier aptes i interpreter
correctement un texte concret, mais des hommes de science capables de remonter
de ce texte A sa raison premiere, i m~me de discerner d'un oeil stir les parties
saines et les lments morbides d'une legislation, ses garanties de durie et ses
chances de transformation." Manuel glimentaire de droit romain (6th ed.
i9z8) 6.
'Willes, J., in Evans v. Wright, supra note i, somewhat expanded.
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often being plaintiff in equity and defendant at law, the person asking
equitable relief will be called the applicant (A), and his opponents the
claimants (C1, C2, etc.).
First, a res may be claimed from an obligor both by the original
obligee and by one who alleges an assignment from this obligee. Thus,
a -chattel in the hands of a bailee, A, is claimed by the bailor, C1, and
by a second claimant, C2 , who says he bought the chattel from C1 after
it was bailed. The bailor denies the sale or alleges it was fraudulent
and brings action against the bailee for the chattel. The alleged pur-
chaser also sues A. The bailee had nothing to do with the sale and
will find it hard to defend either suit because evidence of its validity
or invalidity is not readily accessible to him. Although he assumed
only one obligation, he will be subjected to the serious double vexation
of two litigations. Worse yet, he runs a risk of double liability. Both
juries may find against him and in favor of the respective claimant,
so that the bailee will have to pay for the chattel tWice over.
Such an unjust situation results from two long-established rules of
the common law. (i) An action at law cannot have more than two
sides. Therefore, this three-sided controversy cannot be settled in
a single jury trial, except where the common law has been altered by
statute. (2) A judgment binds only the parties thereto and those in
privity with them. Since the purchaser is not in this sense privy to
the bailor, a judgment for the bailor against the bailee is not res adjudi-
cata as to the purchaser. Although the bailor's jury found the alleged
sale invalid, the purchaser can go ahead and sue the bailee, and can
recover if his, jury is persuaded that the sale was valid. Each jury
proceeds independently of the other, and irideed will be carefully kept
from knowing anything about the other trial or its outcome. Plainly,
in order to protect A from certain double vexation and possible double
liability, our system of law must provide him with an escape from one
at least of these two rules. The second rule is permanent, the first
accidental. The alleged assignee cannot justly be bound by the out-
come of the two-sided proceeding between bailor and bailee; he is
entitled to his day in court. The only way to bind him by that pro-
ceeding is to give him his day in court there, to make him a party to
the litigation between bailor and bailee by a modification of the first
rule against three-sided suits. This rule is capable of change without
injustice. Three-sided suits are practicable, even where a jury trial is
required, so long as it is possible to boil down the dispute into a two-
sided issue for submission to the jury. This is usually the case in
interpleader, which has consequently (as will be shown later) been
allowed in actions at law by statute in many jurisdictions. And equity,
which has no jury and is accustomed to polygonal suits, has long given
the vexed bailee an adequate remedy.
The bailee files a bill of interpleader against the two claimants and
puts the chattel in court. The suit is in two stages. First, the appli-
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cant for relief on one side and the two claimants on the other fight
out the question whether he is entitled to the relief. If he wins, the
first stage ends with a decree allowing the applicant to withdraw from
the case altogether and enjoining the claimants from taking any further
proceedings against him in this controversy. The second stage is a
two-sided fight. between the bailor and the alleged purchaser about the
validity of the sale, and the winner gets the chattel. This second stage
can be tried if so desired by a jury, or else by a master or the equity
judge himself.4  Thus, interpleader, though in one sense a three-cor-
nered suit, is in practice usually separated into two successive two-sided
disputes, the composition of the sides changing at the end of the first
stage.5 The first stage relieves the bailee from double vexation and
liability in a dispute foreign to him; in the second stage, the controversy
is settled by the persons directly concerned.
In another group of cases, the original obligee is not a party, but
each claimant sets up an assignment from the obligee, and the question
involves the priority or validity of the two assignments.6 Thus the
applicant is a savings bank. The res is a deposit, and the depositor
is dead. C1 is his executor, and C2 possesses the book under an alleged
gift causa mortis. The bank pays the money into court and leaves the
claimants to fight out the facts about the gift.
In the situation discussed thus far, we start with a definite obligee
and then ask whether he has transferred his obligation and if so, to
"Maclennan, Interpleader, i6I; 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence (i4th ed. i9x8.)
sec. 1137, states a significant indication of the narrow attitude of the courts
toward inferpleader in his day: "It has been so rare that interpleader bills have
gone to a decree, that some doubts have been entertained as to what is the proper
course" (in the second stage).
'However, if there are more than two claimants the second stage is corre-
spondingly triangular or polygonal, and therefore unsuited for a two-sided jury
issue.
'Cowtan v. Williams (i8o3, Ch.) 9 Ves. iO7 and 2 Ames, Cases on Equity
Jurisdiction (19o4) 2, 8, notes (this second volume of Ames' Cases will be cited
hereafter in this article as "Ames"), support the principle of the bailee and
savings bank illustrations. Recent cases interpleading the original obligee and an
alleged assignee are: Mooney v. Newton (192o, Nev.) 187 Pac. 721; Kenney v.
Bank (1918) 19 Ariz. 338, 1701 Pac. 866; Bathgate v. Exchange Bank (1918) 199
Mo. App. 583, 205 S. W. 875; Continental v. Stoltz (I92O, Calif. App.) 189 Pac.
712; Conner v. Bank (192o, Calif.) 19o Pac. 8oi. Recent cases where two persons
both claiming under the original obligee were interpleaded are: Montgomery v.
Philadelphia (1918, E. D. Pa.) 253 Fed. 473; Fidelity Savings v. Rodgers (i9i9)
i8o Calif. 683, 182 Pac. 426; Caverly v. Small (192o, Me.) iii Atl. 300; Lipsitz
v. Smith (i919) 178 N. C. 98, oo S. E. 247; Modern Order v. Merriman (192o,
Ala.) 85 So. 473; Haase v. First National (1919) 203 Ala. 624, 84 So. 761; Pitts-
burgh v. Ankrom (I918, W. Va.) 97 S. E. 593; Johnson v. Blackmon (i918) ;oi
Ala. 537, 78 So. 891; Marsh v. Mutual (1917) 2oo Ala. 438, 76 So. 370; Schmidt
v. Pittsburgh (917) 256 Pa. 363, ioo At]. 959; lies v. Heidenreich (1917) 202 Ill.
App. i.
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whom. Another class of cases7 exhibits a marked distinction, the great
importance of which will later be made plain. Here the whole disptite
turns on the question-who is the obligee? Which of the claimants
owned the obligation at the very first? The Secretary of the Navy
offers a vessel for sale to the highest bidder. Two persons each claim
to answer the terms of the offer. Interpleader ascertains to which of
them the obligation runs to convey the vessel.8 An express company
advertises a reward for the arrest and conviction of a thief. After
his conviction, several claimants come forward for the reward. The
company is allowed to pay the amount into court, and they settle
among themselves which of them performed the act which constituted
the acceptance in the unilateral contractY A student has been eating
at a college boarding house. He made no express agreement with any
definite person, but expected to pay the standard rates. He runs up a
'Stephens v. Callanan (1823, Exch.) 12 -Price, 158 (occupier agreed to pay
rent to true owner); Livingstone v. Bank (1893) 50 Ill. App. 162 (debt to a
firm whose membership was disputed); Morse v. Stearns (188i) 131 Mass. 389
(two claimants to be the legatee described by the will); Lavelle v. Belliu
(19o6) 121 Mo. App. 442, 97 S. W. 20o, (several claimants -to lost bank-note);
Carter v. Cryer (9o4) 68 N. J. Eq. 24, 59 At. 233, semble (claimants to lost
chattel); Baber v. Houston (1919, Tex. Civ. App.) 218 S. W. z56 (rival
claimants to ownership of land interplead as to purchase price). Trembley v.
Marshall (19o7) 118 App. Div. 839, io3 N. Y. Supp. 68o, (two brokers claiming
commission for the same sale) overruling necessarily McCreery v. Inge (igoo)
49 App. Div. 133, 63 N. Y. Supp. 158; same point, Dardonville v. Smith (i9o9)
133 App. Div. 234, 177 N. Y. Supp. 216; Myers v. Batcheller (1917) 177 App.
Div. 47, 163 N. Y. Supp. 688; Preston v. Rice (i919) I85 App. Div. 682, 173 N. Y.
Supp. 69I; Fox v. Cammeyer (1916, Sup. Ct.) 93 Misc. i8o, I56 N. Y. Supp.
1O46; Brooke v. Smith. (1893) 13 Pa. Co. Ct. 557; Snow v. Ulrich (igo6) 126
Ill. App. 493, distinguishing Sachsel v. Farrar (1889) 35 Ill. App. i7; but see
broker cases below, contra. Mayor of N. Y. v. Flagg .(i858, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 6
Abb. Pr. 296 (interpleader 'of rival claimants to public office, but merely
enjoining the payment of the salary pending quo warranto proceedings, since
the title to the office may be tried only in an action to which the state is a
party) ; cf. City of Buffalo v. Mackey (1878, N. Y.) 15 Hun, 204; and see People
rel. Corscadden v. Howe (i9o4) 177 N. Y. 499, 5o7, 69 N. E. 1I14, 1117. Dorn v.
Fox (1874) 61 N. Y. 264, and cases cited, (tax-collectors of rival towns or
counties levying on the same land br personalty); Bayerischen v. Knaus (19o9)
75 N. J. Eq. 363, 72 Atl. 952, (two women claim insurance as "wife," though
these could perhaps be classed as competing assignees of the life) ; Packard v.
Stevens (1899) 58 N. J. Eq. 489, 46 Atl. 25o (two contractors dispute which did
the work) ; see also cases in notes 8, 9, 10, 35 infra. Contra, Hoyt v. Gouge
(i9o4) x25 IoWa, 6o3, 10 N. W. 464; Maxwell v. Frazier (19o8) 52 Ore. 183, 96
Pac. 548, both broker cases.
" United States v. Levinson (192, C. C. A. 2d) 267 Fed. 692; see (12I)
34 HARv. L. Rav. 556.
*Webster v. Hall (188o) 6o N. H. 7; City Bank v. Bangs (1831, N. Y. Ch.)
Paige, 570; Fargo v. Arthur (1872, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 43 How. Pr. 193; Burritt
v. Press Pub. Co. (1897) 19 App. Div. 6o9, 46 N. Y. Supp. 295; contra, Collis 7.
Lee (1835, C. P.) i Hodges, 204.
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large bill. A quarrel breaks out between the cook and her husband
as to which owns the establishment, and each sues the student. Inter-
pleadef enables him to pay his bill only once and prevents them from
saddling him with their matrimonial infelicities. 0
Interpleader is such a desirable remedy that in 1831 the English
Interpleader Act brought it into the law courts. A defendant in
assumpsit, debt, detinue, or trover was allowed to move for an inter-
pleader rule, showing that the right was claimed by a third person, who,
if a proper case was established; would be brought into the' suit, and
the defendant would be discharged on putting the res into court. This
statute was merely procedural, and permitted. a law court to entertain
an interpleader proceeding with all the incidents and limitations which
we shall find surrounding the same proceeding in equity. Thus, the
grounds for the remedy were not liberalized, although occasional
emphasis was laid by judges on the clause allowingthem to make such
rules "as may appear just and reasonable."' 2  Similar statutes have
been passed in many states in this country, and interpreted in much the
same way.' s It will be observed that the second stage of this inter-
pleader at law is tried by a jury.
The fundamental purpose of interpleader is simple and just. The
applicant has incurred one obligation, but is subjected to two or more
claims. If one claim is right, the rest must be wrong. An efficient
and fair-minded system of justice ought not to subject a citizen to
double vexation on a single obligation, if this can be easily and satis-
factorily avoided. "The office of an interpleader suit," said Vice-
Chancellor Wigram," "is not to protect a party against a double lia-
"bility, but *against double vexation in respect of one liability." The
case is all the stronger where there is a risk of double liability. And
if the rigid rules of the law courts make it impossible for him to get
relief there, the more reason why he should get it in equity, which is
used to three-cornered litigation and abhors multiciplicity. If equity
too becomes rigid, where shall he turn ? The administration of justice
should provide the cure for its own evils. It has a cure for this evil
"Kile v. Goodrum (i9oo) 87 Ill. App. 462.
U I & 2 Win. IV, c. 58.
'" Maclennan, op. cit., 17.
"2Maclennan, op. cit., Appendix, gives the statutes of all the states in 1901:
see especially, N. Y. Code of Civil Procedure and the cases construing it. The
introduction of interpleader at law is no bar to interpleader in equity, Ames, 5o,
note. The 1915 amendment of the United States Judicial Code, sec. 274b,
possibly allows interpleader at law; but see Sherman v. Shubert (1916, S. D.
X. Y.) 238. Fed. 225, (917, C. C. A. 2d) 247 Fed. 246. See notes on these statutes,
i Am. St. Rep. 8oo; 35 Am. Dec. 7io; p. 84o, note io, infra.
, Crawford v. Fisher (1842, Ch.) i Hare, 436, 44i; so also, Livingston v. Bank
(1893) So 1ll. App. 562, 566.
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in interpleader, if it is stripped of its technicalities and granted when-
ever an applicant 15 is vexed by two or more mutually exclusive claims.
Two claims are mutually exclusive when they necessarily overlap.
One example will make clear what is meant. If A offers a commission
to any broker who effects a sale of certain land and two brokers claim
the commission, only one can be entitled because there can be but one
sale. The claims overlap and cannot both be right. The requisite for
interpleader exists.' 6  Suppose, however, A makes a contract with a
broker C, to pay him a commission if he finds a purchaser ready, able,
and willing to pay $2oo an acre for the land, and makes a similar con-
tract with C,. If both brokers produce purchasers as described and
sue for their commissions there is no mutual exclusiveness. A's obli-
gation to one broker is in no way conditioned on the previous non-
production of a purchaser by some other broker. A may very likely
be liable to both. The two suits are based on two obligations, not one.
He cannot compel the'brokers to interplead, for there is no controversy
between them.'7 In other words, when the two claims may both be
right, and the validity of one does not depend upon the invalidity of
the other, there is no reason why law or equity should unite them in one
proceeding.
There must, in short, be only one obligation due from the applicant,
and in addition there must be genuine double vexation with respect to
this one obligation. Certain safeguards have grown up in practice to
prevent an applicant from obtaining interpleader when he is not really
the victim of double vexation.
(i) If one of the two claims is clearly groundless, relief will not be
granted, 8 for the applicant can without hazard ascertain whether he
owes the other claimant, and if he does may safely pay him. The
obligor must not be allowed to prevent legal proceedings by a claimant
5A claimant should also be able to initiate interpleader proceedings if a typical
situation exists, as in the analogous Scotch action of multiplepoinding. • This was
allowed by Doe, C. J., Webster v. Hall (i88o). 6o N. H. 7; and in Connecticut by
statute, Pub. Laws, 1893, ch. 42, Browrn v. Clark (igo8) go Conn. 419, 68 At. Iooi;
but many cases deny relief, Ames, 2, note.
"See the broker cases in note 7 supra.
1 Alton v. Merritt (192o) 145 Minn. 426, i77 N. W. 770. For other cases
of double liability see Ames, 38, note; io L. R. A. (N. s.) 758, note; Pratt v.
Worrell (I9O4) 66 N. J. Eq. I94, 57 Atl. 450; Natl. Security v'. Batt (1913) 215
Mass. 489, io2 N. E. 691.
' B. & 0. Ry. v. Arthur (1882) 90 N. Y. 244; Modern v. Merriman (ig2o, Ala.)
85 So. 473. While interpleader should properly be denied if it appears from
the bill or the first stage of the suit that one claim is clearly groundless, the
applicant ought not to be required to set out in his bill (or motion) a reasonably
strong case for each claimant, inasmuch as he is often ignorant of the evidence
and grounds upon which they rely. Fidelity v. Rodgers (7920, Calif.) 182 Pac.
8oi; dissenting opinion in Pouch v. Prudential (ig92) 2o4 N. Y. 281, 97 N. E.
731. See Ann. Cas. 1913C, ii96, note.
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who has some case, through trumping up a second baseless claim to the
same obligation. He may not shift the burdens of litigation to a
dummy. If the applicant is subject to only one danger of suit and
liability, he has no more right to equitable protection that any other
defendant in an action at law.
(2) The applicant must accompany his bill with an affidavit that
the bill is not filed in collusion with any claimant or at his request,
but that his only intent in seeking equitable relief is to avoid being
sued or molested by the claimants.19 The truth of this affidavit, if
questioned, must be proved at the hearings.
(3) The res must be put in court or held at the disposition of the
court.
One reason for these safeguards is that the plaintiff in interpleader
is accorded certain traditional privileges which might easily be abused.
If sued at law by the rightful claimant he would have to pay his own
counsel fees and all the costs; but in interpleader he is relieved of
costs from the time of filing his bill and often for the preceding process
at law, besides getting his counsel fees. And from the time he puts
the res into court, he ceases to be liable for interest," which would
ordinarily run until the rightful obligee was paid; if the res is a chattel,
he is similarly relieved of subsequent damages for its detention. He-
is not allowed to obtain these advantages unless actually subject to
double vexation, unless he comes into equity as a stakeholder to ward
off a dispute in which he has no part, and not for the purpose of
gaining something for himself or any particular claimant. If he is
to benefit from the litigation, he ought not to be thus exempt from its
burdens. At a later point I shall argue that it is better to take away
a portion of these privileges than to deny interpleader when the appli-
cant has a minor, interest in the res, but the requirement of a substan-
tial neutrality in the dispute between the claimants is sound.
A more fundamental reason for this neutrality and for the generally
suspicious attitude of the courts toward interpleader is that it is often
the means of getting a purely legal issue into equity. The second stage
of the interpleader may settle disputes about ownership, etc., which
are ordinarily jury questions. The only basis for the equitable juris-
diction over such matters is the double vexation, so that the court has
to assure itself that this exists. Also, if C, has a dispute of title with
C2 about an obligation, C, may be very anxious to avoid the chances
of a jury trial, and conceive the clever plan that instead of suing C2
at law he will bribe the obligor to jockey the case into equity for him
by interpleading. Equity will not countenance this, nor will it allow the
applicant to transfer his own controversies about the res from law to
equity. This reason has less weight, of course, in interpleader under
For forms, see 3 Daniell, Chancery Pleading and Practice (6th Amer. ed.
1854) 2003*.
, Conner v. Bank (1920, Calif.) igo Pac. 8Ol; Ann. Cas. 1912B, Ioo5, note.
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the Codes, which retain the jury trial and allow the defendant in the
original action at law to substitute a claimant in his stead. Even here,
however, the court will not let the obligor avoid his responsibility of
defending unless he really has no part in the dispute. And, in general,
interpleader will not be granted by equity if the law courts provide an
adequate remedy through some other type of proceeding, such as
garnishment or a statutory trial of title.
21
On the whole, these requirements of a reasonable apprehension of
double vexation, absence of collusion, and the deposit of the res in
court, are sound and grow out of the inherent nature of the remedy
of interpleader. Some other requirements meet with no serious objec-
tion if sensibly interpreted. (4) The stakeholder must not have been
placed in his precarious position through his own fault, and must be
free from slothfulness. 22  Otherwise, he cannot fairly ask the claim-
ants to pay his costs and counsel fees and relieve him of further
worries of litigation. (5) Equity must have the power to enjoin the
claimants from prosecuting their claims against the applicant outside
of the interpleader proceedings, for otherwise it could not close the
controversy. If actions against the applicant are already pending; in
courts of another sovereign, or* if some claimants cannot be brought
within the jurisdiction of the court which is asked to compel them to
interplead, serious difficulties arise, which need only be mentioned
here.23  Apart from these difficulties of conflict of laws, which no
remedy can wholly escape, it would be an easy matter for courts to
apply the general principle of interpleader, so highly praised by Sir
James Willes, if the five requirements already named were the only
limitations on that principle.
We must now consider whether any further requirements ought to
exist. Four additional limitations are imposed by a multitude of
decisions, and change interpleader from a simple and expeditious
remedy into a difficult and technical problem, so that we may well echo
the despairing words of the greatest American 
jurist :24
"The doctrine on this whole subject is not well defined. And I
cannot but regret that it is not in my power to give a more full and
clear exposition of it."
The classic and oft-quoted statement of these four limitations is by
Pomeroy :25
'MLay v. Montowese (gig, Conn.) io8 AtI. 664; Killian v. Ebbinghaus
(884) 1O U. S. 568, 4 Sup. Ct. 232.
'Ames, i6, 50, notes; Homer v. Willcocks (1846, Q. B.) I Ir. Jur. (o.s.)
136; the courts have been unduly harsh in applying this limitation.
"Smith v. Reed (i908) 74 N. J. Eq. 776, 70 AtI. 96i; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v.
Duntevy (i96) 24I U. S. 518, 36 Sup. Ct. 613; see (1916) 30 H.Av. L. Rxv. 86.
22 Story, op cit. note 4, at sec. 1127, n. 2.
"4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed. igig) sec. 1322. See also 35 Am.
Dec. 695, note; 91 Am. St. Rep. 593, note.
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"i. The same thing, debt or duty must be claimed by both or all the
parties against whom the relief is demanded; 2. All their adverse titles
or claims must be dependent, or be derived from a common source;
3. The person asking the relief must not have or claim any interest
in the subject-matter; 4. He must have incurred no independent lia-
bility to either of the claimants; that is, he must stand perfectly indif-
ferent between them, in the position merely of a stakeholder."
The most important is the second, often summed up as privity. An
investigation of these limitations will show that they are partly his-
torical incidents of interpleader unnecessary to its rational purpose
and partly over-rigid attempts to state the tests of mutual exclusiveness
and double vexation. Judges have taken great trouble to hem in the
remedy of interpleader by these limitations with somewhat the same
intellectual pleasure that a solitaire player exhibits in devising new
rules which will make it harder for him to win the game. The busi-
ness of courts is justice, and in the twentieth century we should bestir
ourselves to scrape away antiquarian and metaphysical incrustations
from any remedy that is as admirably fitted as interpleader to attain
justice.
Interpleader, however, has never wholly escaped from the limitations
of the Middle Ages. Some discussion of the historical origin of the
remedy i§ essential to a comprehension of the four requirements just
named. It is not aai invention of the Chancellor, but is borrowed from
the- old common-law Writ of interpleader, which, like other peculiar
writs, gradually disappeared after the introduction of the jury;
although this new trier of facts supplied a more rational mode of pro-
cedure, it demanded a narrow issue and was unsuited to such old
practices as interpleader and prohibition.28 Interpleader at common
law may be roughly divided into four situations.27 (i) If two persons
jointly bailed a chattel, usually charters, to a bailee with instructions
to re-deliver it to one or the other bailor according to the outcome of
a specified contingency, a dispute frequently arose between the bailors,
and both brought actions of detinue against the bailee. He was allowed
to interplead thejoint bailors.. (2) If one bailor delivered .a chattel to
the bailee for re-delivery to another person on the happening of a
certain event, a similar dispute might arise. Interpleader was allowed
if the bailor and the third pers6n both brought detinue. (3) The
finder of a chattel was given the same remedy against detinue by several
claimants to its ownership. (4) Interpleader was also allowed to a
person subjected to double vexation from various obsolete actions.
Hazeltine, The Early History of English Equity, in Essays in Legal History
(Vinogradoff's ed. 1913) 261.
"The source of all other discussions of this topic is 2 Reeves, History of
English Law, (Finlason's ed. 1869) 635-640. The Year Books and other primary
sources ought to be investigated afresh, since many points might be discovered
which escaped Reeves' attention.
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For example, if a bishop was asked by two different persons to appoint
two respective clergymen to a single church, the advowson being
claimed by each of the contestants, interpleader furnished an excellent
refuge to the bishop from two actions of quare impedit and from a
situation which seems thoroughly vicious to us with our congregational
traditions.
It will be observed that there is a marked distinction between the
first two types of common-law interpleader and the last two, the same
distinction which we have already pointed out in the modern cases.
In the two bailment situations, we start with a definite obligation and
a relation between the claimants. In the finder and bishop cases, the
ownership of the obligation is uncertain from the start, and there is
no relation between the two claimants. It is therefore significant that
only in the bailment cases do we find the common-law writers speaking
of a requirement of privity.
The Chancellor found it easier to take over and remodel this com-
mon-law remedy, because he was already used to handling cases of
double vexation when trustees sought the advice of equity as to which
of two competing beneficiaries was rightfully entitled to the res .
2
Here, of course, equity had independent jurisdiction on account of the
trust, but it was only a short step for the Chancellor to deal with
instances of double vexation where there was no other ground of
equitable jurisdiction, on the analogy of the common-law interpleader.
Spence gives an instance of relief in equity in 1559, and the first
reported case, Hackett v. Webb, 29 was in 1676. At first the Chancellors
considered it dangerous to allow "new inventions ' 30 in bills of inter-
pleader outside the general scope of the common-law remedy, although
they never restricted it to relief against detinue. Much of this
reluctance survived.31 Interpleader still suffers from its infantile
repressions.
We are now in a position to examine Pomeroy's four rules, one by
one, although it will be possible to keep them wholly separate.
THE SAME THING, DEBT, OR" DUTY
This requirement of identity partly arises from the primitive sim-
plicity of common-law interpleader, where each claim was directed to
precisely the same object without the possibilities of variation which
are presented by modern life, and partly is only an unsuccessful
i Spence, Equity Jurisdiction (1846) 39o, 659.
(z676, Ch.) Cas. temp. Finch, 257.
H rdwicke, C., Metcalf v. Hervey (1749, Ch.) x Ves. Sr. 248, 249.
See Brougham, C., in Pearson v. Cardon (1831, Ch.) 2 Russ. & M. 6o6, 613:
"You can have no interpleader here, if upon principle you could not have it at
law;" and the adverse comment in 2 Story, op. cit., sec. ii6, n. 3; 35 Am. Dec.
696, note;'gi Am. St. Rep. 597, note.
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attempt to phrase the principle of mutual exclusiveness. The differ-
ence between that principle and the identity test as commonly applied
will soon be plain. A typical statement of this test in its narrowest
form was made by Vice-Chancellor Shadwell in 1840 :32
"A case of interpleader then arises where the same subject, whether
debt, duty, or thing, is claimed. Now, when the subject in dispute has
a bodily 'existence, no difficulty can arise on the ground of identity;
for no dispute can arise as to the identity of matter. But, where the
subject in dispute is a chose in action, which has no bodily existence,
it becomes necessary to determine what constitutes identity. Where
the claims made by the defendants are of different amounts, they can
never be identical; but where they are the same in amount, that circum-
stance goes far to determine their identity. The amount,, however,
may not be sufficient, of itself, to determine the identity; for the amount
may be the same, and the debt may be different."
This is obviously much narrower than the test advocated in this
article, that interpleader should be granted whenever there is multiple
vexation but in substance only one obligation. The obligor ought not
to be subjected to needless worry and expense just because this single
obligation is given a different technical form or a different amount by
the various claimants. The identity test may have been appropriate
to common-law interpleader, but modern courts should reject as too
formal a test which refuses relief unless the claims coincide at every
point like two superimposed triangles in plane geometry.
i. Consider first Shadwell's logical denial of interpleader under this
test if the claims differ in amount. This recalls Aristotle's belief that
if an action was brought to recover a debt of 20 minae, it would be
dangerous to give the tribunal discretion to allow the plaintiff to prove
and recover only 18 minae. Even the cautious Pomeroy declares
Shadwell's statement -"alike opposed to principle and to authority."
33
It would be absurd to refuse relief in the boarding-house case because
the wife put the bill at $6o and the husband at $59. A recent Alabama
decision3 ' granting interpleader although some claimants wanted the
whole res and others only a part is typical of the current of judicial
opinion, and expressly repudiates Shadwell's view.
2. Peculiar difficulties arise in cases where the same property is
assessed for taxes in two different cities or towns. For example, a
tax-payer who spends the winter in the city and the summer in a rural
part of the same state may have his domicil disputed and be in real
danger of having to pay two taxes on his stocks and bonds (if subject
to direct tax) and on tangible pe,-sonalty like automobiles. The
amounts claimed by the two jurisdictions are rarely the same, but in
I Glyn v. Duesbury (1840, Ch.) ii Sim. i39, 148.
34 Pomeroy, op. cil., sec. 1466, and cases cited.
" Enterprise v. Dothan (913) I81 Ala. 388, 6i So. 93o; see also School Dist.
v. Weston (1875) 31 Mich. 85.
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justice he is liable only once. It is also contended that the duty is not
identical in the two claims, since each jurisdiction acts independently of
the other in levying the assessment under which the duty to pay arises.
No such difficulty would arise under the mutual exclusiveness test, and
even the identity test seems to be satisfied, because the citizen owes
one duty to the state to pay taxes on his personalty. The duty is not
primarily to the locality of his domicil, but to the state, which has by
statute selected some local government as its agent to enforce this
duty and fix its pecuniary extent. The question is, which locality is
its agent in this particular case? There are not two duties claimed by
two different places, but only one duty whose ownership they dispute,
and about whose size in dollars they differ. The situation is analogous
to the finder's position at common law. A further objection is, that
the applicant in interested to have his domicil fixed in the place which
levies the smaller tax, but Pomeroy's third requirement seems to be
sufficiently satisfied if he pays the larger amount into court and with-
draws without further participation in the controversy. Neutrality in
thought is not demanded, only neutrality in deed.
Therefore, interpleader will be granted to the tax-payer 35 except in
jurisdictions where public policy is held to forbid the injunction of
tax-officials, on the ground that the state should not be forced to wait
for its money until the validity of a tax is decided. Instead, the citizen
is forced to pay under protest and wait for his money until the tax is
declared illegal in an action of quasi-contract. In these states, if two
towns assess the same propeAy, he cannot pay the larger tax assessed
into court and compel the two officials to fight out his domicil between
themselves, while they are enjoined from proceeding further against
him. He must pay the two taxes to the two towns, and then bring
two separate actions of quasi-contract to get his money back. Inas-
much as both juries will normally prefer him to be taxed in their own
neighborhood, it is by no means improbable that the verdicts in both
suits will go against him. He will be doubly taxed, because'the law
refuses to provide machinery to ascertain which tax is illegal, though it
is plain that one must be illegal. At least he should be enabled to
bring a single quasi-contract action against the two towns as defendantst
in the alternative. 36 One defendant must be liable, but the jury
would decide which. This is a sort of interpleader turned inside out.
"4 Pomeroy, op. cit., sec. 1467; Ames, 17, note; (igii) 25 1LRv. L. REv.
I74.13 Such an action seems permitted by Conn. Practice Book, i9o8, 238, General
Rules, sec. I2o: "Persons may be joined as defendants against whom the right
to relief is alleged to exist in the alternative, although a right to relief against
one may be inconsistent with a right to relief against the other." Among other
states with similar provisions, usually statutory, are Minnesota, New Jersey,
New York, and Rhode Island. See note by Austin W. Scott (920) 33 HARV. L.
REv. 244; (1918) 31 id. 1034; G. R. Alston, Joinder of Claims under Alternative
Ambiguities (1898) 12 id. 45.
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It would not violate the alleged policy against tax-injunctions, would
avoid double taxation, and also obviates the slight possibility that two
independent juries might both find in favor of the tax-payer and allow
him to escape from his double vexation with no taxation at all. How-
ever, it would be much better to grant interpleader and discard the
policy altogether wherever an injunction is asked against a tax which
shows strong signs of illegality. I submit that the so-called policy
against tax-injunctions is only bad policy. It is better for the state
and its subsidiary taxing units to lose a little interest now and then than
to force a citizen to pay a tax twice over when one payment is con-
cededly illegal, or even to pay once in cases of doubtful legality and
wait for his money through a tedious litigation at law. The creditor
who forcibly seizes twice as much money as his debtor owes him
offends all standards of common honesty. Whether the state is merely
a glorified public service company, as Leon Duguit contends, or, in
the loftier conceptions of public opinion and T. H. Green, is an ethical
culture society to lead its citizens onward and upward, on neither view
has it any business to finance its work by plainly dishonest methods.3 7
The loyalty and energetic devotion of citizens would also be encour-
aged if interpleader were available when the same property is taxed in
two or more states, each claiming to be the situs. Since it can not be
in two places at once, the claims are mutually exclusive, but they are
surely not identical, unlike the case of two towns in the same state.
There is no superstate law which imposes a duty to pay taxes in the
state of one's domicil. Each state claims under the alleged legal
duty created by itself, so that there is no duty common to both
states. This brings out the narrowness of the "same debt, duty,
"or thing" test, but even if we can substitute mutual exclusiveness,
other and fatal obstacles make it impossible to interplead the tax
officials of the two contending states. (i) Relief cannot be ob-
tained in the courts of one state, for they have no jurisdiction over the
officials of the other state. (2) Relief cannot be obtained in the
United States courts, because they will not enjoin state tax officials;
because the requisite diversity of citizenship is probably lacking38 and
" For ancient examples of the "dishonesty of sovereignties," see Zimmern,
Greek Commonwealth (2d ed. i95) 304, on the periodical debasing of the
coinage as a means of revenue. For modern examples, see the repudiation of
state debts; and the refusal of Anglo-Saxon governments to admit legal liability
for torts, discussed by John M. Maguire, State Liability for Tort (1916) 3o
HARV. L. REV. 2o, and H. J. Laski, The Responsibility of the State in England
(939) 32 id. 447.
"There is much disagreement as to what diversity of citizenship is necessary
for interpleader in the United States Courts. (i) Possibly A, C1, and C, must
be residents respectively of three different states. Mutual Life v. Alien
(883) 134 Mass. 389; Republic v. Keogh (1881, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 23 Hun, 644;
George v.. Pilcher (1877, Va.) 28 Gratt. 299. This requires diversity in both the
first and the second stage. (2) Sherman v. Shubert (917, C. C. A. 2d) 247
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no federal question is raised by absence of due process of law or other-
wise; and because of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Since the tax official of one state is admittedly within
his powers (but of which state is uncertain), proceedings against that
official are really against his state, and this is prohibited by the Amend-
ment. Seven cities claimed Homer dead, and as many American
states may seek to levy inheritance taxes on the estate of a deceased
millionaire, but the much needed means of joining them all in one
action is forbidden by our constitutional system of sovereign states.
3. Another logical result of the identity test would be the denial of
interpleader when the claimants select different forms of action. For-
tunately few decisions have been thus wooden. Interpleader was
granted in 1676 in Hackett v. Webb,39 although C1 sued in covenant on
a bond and C2 brought an action of money had and received. In
Morgan v. Marsack40 one claim was at law and the other in equity.
The courts are apt to ignore other differences in forms of action in
the same liberal spirit. It was well enough for the common-law courts
in Year Book days to refuse interpleader unless both actions were in
detinue, or quare impedit; modern equity looks at the substance.
Thus a recent Alabama case 1 holds it immaterial that one claim is on
a negotiable check and the other on a mere debt. Occasionally a
narrow case occurs. In a North Dakota decision,
4 2 a warehouseman
was denied interpleader against the receiver of his bailor who asked
for the bailed grain or the proceeds thereof, and an alleged mortgagee
of the bailor who sued for damages for conversion of the grain. Ap-
parently the mortgage was subsequent to the bailment, and if so there
was privity and abundant authority for relief.
43  The court said that
the claimants were not claiming the same property or debt, since any
judgment the mortgage obtained must be satisfied in money, whereas
the receiver, although suing for damages in the alternative, might be
satisfied by the delivery of grain in accordance with the storage
receipts. As to him the applicant was a bailee, as to the mortgagee a
tortfeasor. Yet there was clearly mutual exclusiveness, and all the
claims arose from the only substantial obligation, the'duty of the bailee
Fed. 256, gave interpleader, although the claimants were co-citizens, on the
ground that the relief was ancillary to the pending action at law of C against
A, who were not co-citizens; but see (1917) 30 HARv. L. Rav. 520. There is
then no diversity of citizenship in the adjudication of ownership in the second
stage. (3) The federal Insurance Interpleader Act, Feb. 22, 1917 (39 Stat. at L.
929), requires only that the claimants be of different states. Diversity will then
be lacking in the first stage. Quaere as to constitutionality, Penn. Mutual
v. H'enderson (1917, N. D. Fla.) 244 Fed. 877.
'Supra note 29.
(1816, Ch.) 2 Mer. io6; Ames, 6, note 5.
Marsh v. Mutual (1917) 2oo Ala. 438, 76 So. 370.
'More v. Western Grain Co. (915) 31 N. D. 369, 153 N. W. 976.
"See note 6.
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under the bailment. The fact that the mortgagee elected to sue in
tort should not cheat the stakeholder out of just relief.4" The case has
been deservedly condemned.45
4. The difficulty is greater when the two claimants do not both ask
for money damages, but one of them insists on specific relief. Thus
in England, despite the broad attitude taken by the courts since the
Judicature 'Act of 1873--of which more hereafter-interpleader was
denied to an insurance company against joint policy-holders, one of
whom insisted on having the house rebuilt in pursuance 'of an old
statute, while the other demanded the insurance money.4 6 Yet only one
claim can be sound, and there is the same duty in substance on which
both claimants rely, the lawful obligation of the insurer as imposed
by law and the policy. The same principle would apply in the North
Dakota case if one claimant sued for the grain itself in replevin and
the other for its money value.
PRIVITY
The superiority of the simple test of mutual exclusiveness over the
four requirements stated by Pomeroy appears even more strongly in
the second requirement of privity, which has caused endless discussion
and perplexity in the cases. Interpleader is refused unless the claims
are -"dependent, or derived from a common source." Pomeroy's state-
ment may be supplemented by others. Story says47 in a passage which
is quoted in many American decisions:
"The true doctrine supported by the authorities would seem to be
that in cases of adverse independent titles the party holding the prop-
erty must defend himself as well as he can at law; and he is not entitled
to the assistance of a court of equity, for that would be to assume the
right to try merely legal titles upon a controversy between different
parties, where there is no privity of contract between them and the third
person, who calls for an interpleader."
Notice that this requires privity among all three parties, including the
applicant, and not merely between the claimants; the latter is usually
the test applied. Lord Cottenham states that the adverse claim must
"'The decision also turns upon the wording of the North Dakota statute, and
proves the need of careful drafting in statutory regulation of interpleader.
The statute allows interpleader at .law to "a defendant against whom an action
is pending upon a contract, or for specific real or personal property." It was
held that an action to recover damages for conversion is not an action for
specific personal property. Thus a shrewd claimant can defeat interpleader by
choosing trover instead of replevin. Of course, it should make no difference,
either, that A is treated as a tortfeasor by this claimant; his hands are clean
despite a possible technical conversion.
"(1916) 2 IowA L. Bum- 97.
'Sun Insurance Office v. Galinsky [1914, C. A.] 2 K. B. 545.
472 Story, op. cit., sec. 1135.
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be "under a derivative, and not under a paramount title.
'48 Maclennan
gives a somewhat different phrasing :4
"It is a prime rule in equity, that the titles of the adverse claimants
must be connected, by reason of one being derived from the other, or
by both being derived from a common source. There must be privity
of some sort between all the parties, such as privity of estate, title or
contract."
It is plain that this kind of privity is entirely distinct from privity to
a judgment. For example, in the situation first considered in this
article, where the bailee interpleads his bailor and an alleged assignee,
there is privity between the claimants, but not in the sense that if the
bailor gets a judgment against the bailee, this will be res adjudicata as
to the assignee. He can bring a second suit against the bailee, and
may, as we have seen, force him to pay a second time.
The text-writers quoted agree in condemning this requirement.
Pomeroy declares :50
"It is a manifest imperfection of the equity jurisdiction that it should
be so limited. A person may be, and is exposed to danger, vexation,
and loss from conflicting independent claims to the same thing, as well
as from claims which are dependent; and there is certainly nothing in
the nature of the remedy which need prevent it from being extended to
both classes of demands."
Maclennan says much the same.51  Story in 1843 added to the passage
quoted above the following sentences :-52
"Whether it might not have been more wise, and more consistent
with the principles of equity, originally to have held, that in all cases
whatsoever, where the bailee was innocent, and without any fault, he
should have a right to a bill of interpleader is a point, into which it is
now too late to inquire,"
This doctrine, which Story unwillingly clung to because of its age,
had then a venerable antiquity of fourteen years. Indeed, though
privity was first mentioned in equity by Leach, M. R., in 1829,rs and by
a dictum of Lord Brougham in I83I", there was no decision by a
Chancellor to support the doctrine until 1837,"1 barely six years before
Crawshay v. Thornton (1837, Ch.) : Myl. & C. 1, 23.
Maclennan, op. cit., 122.
s4 Pomeroy, op. cit., sec. 1468.
'Op. Cit., 122.
'This first appears in the 3d ed. 1843, sec. 820; I4 th ed. 1918, sec. 1135.
"Cooper v'. De Tastet (1829, Ch.) Taml. 177; see also Lowe v. Richardson
(1818, Ch.) 3 Madd. 277, Shadwell, V. C.; but see Morley v. Thompson, (18ig,
Ch.) id. 564.
"Pearson v. Cardon (1831, Ch.) 2 Russ. & Myl. 6o6, 6o8, granting interpleader.
' Crawshay v. Thornton, supra; the decision of Shadwell, V. C., below, rests
entirely on independent liability (1835, Ch.) 7 Sim. 391. '
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Story, on the strength of a few recent English cases without any
American approval of the doctrine, said it was "too late" to consider
the requirement. I submit that equity, with its well-established power
to alter, improve, and invent,56 ought in the twentieth century to repu-
diate forever a doctrine which rests on such a slight foundation, and
has been stigmatized by the best writers on interpleader and by many
judges as unjust and inconsistent with the admirable purpose of this
remedy.
This technical doctrine of privity got into equity by accident.
Mutual exclusiveness requires no connection between the claims except
that the validity of one shall necessitate the invalidity of the other. As
late as 1814 Lord Eldon granted interpleader in a case Where privity
was by no means certain. 57 Two factors explain the appearance of the
conception in Brougham's opinion of 1831.
First, inspired probably by Reeves' History of English Law, he took
an unfortunate interest in the obsolete action of interpleader at common
law,58 and instead of treating it merely as an antiquarian source for
more liberal remedies in equity, he insisted on limiting his powers as a
nineteenth century Chancellor by rules laid down by common-law
judges in the Wars of the Roses.
"You can have no interpleader here, if upon principle you could not
have it at law." 59
Just because in the common-law bailment cases the claimants were
naturally associated with each other in a relation involving privity of
contract, Brougham demanded that privity should always accompany
interpleader. He might just as sensibly have announced that common-
law interpleader was given only for actions of detinue, and denied it in
equity for assumpsit or covenant. Chancellors had long demolished
such limits.6 0 And Brougham entirely overlooked the fact that even
the Year 'Books did not require any connection between the claimants
in the finding and advowson cases. The accidental linking of privity
with interpleader in some of the very few situations where this remedy
lay at common law was assumed to indicate a basic principle which had
to be rigidly maintained, just as a child who has jam on his bread
once always insists on bread and jam.
Secondly, just as privity between the claimants was accidentally
present in some of the Year Book cases where interpleader was granted,
although it was not a requisite even then for all interpleader, so also
it was accidentally absent from some equity cases which denied inter-
pleader for other reasons. Nineteenth century authorities, ignoring
the total silence of Chancellors from 16761 to 1831 with regard to this
'Jessel, M. R., In re Hallett's Estate (1886) L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696, 710.
Stevenson v. Anderson (1814, Ch.) 2 Ves. & Beames 407.
See note 27, supra.
wPeason v. Cardon (1831, Ch.) 2 Russ. & Myl. 6D6, 613. See note 31.
'In Hackett v. Webb, supra note 29, the actions were covenant and assumpsit.
' See note 29.
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sweeping doctrine of privity, have assumed that these old equity
decisions rested on such a doctrine. These decisions must now be
examined briefly to show that they furnish it no support.
A tenant could not call on his landlord to interplead with a third
party who claimed under a title paramount to the landlord.
6 2  Such
cases say nothifig about a general doctrine of privity in interpleader,
but rest expressly on special circumstances in the relation of landlord
and tenant. The best reasons63 for denying interpleader in this situa-
tion are the reluctance of equity to try title to land, which has now
largely disappeared in other equitable remedies with the substitution of
testimony in open court for written interrogatories; and the absence of
any risk of double liability and any practical danger of double vexa-
tion. Suppose that a stranger to the landlord's title insists that he
owns the premises. The tenant would have real cause for apprehen-
sion if in addition to the landlord's claim for rent this stranger could
bring an action for use and occupation against the tenant, on the
ground that he was under "a promise implied in law" to turn over the
fruits of his unjust enrichment to the true owner. The law, however,
gives the stranger no such claim. For historical reasons, a disseisor of
land cannot be sued for use and occupation.
64 Consequently, the only
possible liability of the tenant to the stranger is in an action of eject-
ment, followed by trespass for mesne profits. Here we come to the
vital point-the tenant's position in ejectment is so favorable that
interpleader is practically unnecessary. First, there 'is no danger of
double liability through two juries deciding different ways, as in the
ordinary interpleader situation, because there is privity of estate
between landlord and tenant, and a judgment between the stranger
and the tenant that the former has title will be res adjiudicata against
the landlord, and prevent any further claim oji his part against the
aDungey v. Angove (x794, Ch.) 2 Ves. Jr. 304; Johnson v. Atkinson (W797,
Exch.) 3 Ans. 798; see Ames, ii, note; 1o L. R. A. (N. s.) 751, note.
" Other reasons given are (a) the things demanded are different, rent and
unliquidated damages, but this is no obstacle in cases where privity exists; (b)
an outsider would stir up the tenant to interplead, so that the landlord might be
compelled to disclose his title in the second stage of the interpleader, whereas-if
sued by the outsider in ejectment the landlord could rest on his possession as
prima facie title, but this reason is also unsound, for the burden of proof could
be made the same in interpleader as in ejectment and possession allowed to be
a prima facie case until the stranger maintained his burden by showing an
apparently good title in himself. So with chattels, Davis v. Levey (I86I) II
U. C. C. P. 292; Ireland v. Ireland (i886, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 42 Hun, 212.
"Ames, Assumpsit for Use and Occupation (i889) 2 HARv. L. REv. 377;
Keener, Quasi-Contracts (1893) 191, I92; 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920)
,515. Some of the old cases assume that the action lay. Johnson -v. Atkinson,
supra; Stephens v. Callanan, supra note 7. For a neat illustration of the
difference between land and chattels in this action, see Stockett v. Watkins
(183o, Md.) 2 G. &. J. 326, allowing assumpsit for use of slaves on the land but
not for use of the land.
' See p. 815, supra.
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tenant.68 Secondly, there is no practical danger even of double vexa-
tion, because just as soon as the tenant is sued in ejectment he gets all
the benefits of interpleader in the ejectment action itself by vouching
his landlord to come in and substitute himself as a defendant to uphold
the title, while the tenant withdraws the same as in interpleader. As
Lord Loughborough states the relief :"7
"The law has taken such anxious care to settle their rights arising
out of that relation, that the tenant attacked throws himself upon his
landlord. He has nothing to do with any claim adverse to his landlord.
He puts the landlord in his place."
This is for all practical purposes interpleader in the law court, analo-
gous to the relief under the Interpleader Act of 1831 and the American
codes and statutes.
6 8
It is theoretically possible that the landlord might not come in, but
instead would be shabby enough to sue the tenant for rent, so that he
would be subject to double vexation, although double liability would be
avoided, because such a refusal would be an eviction and would
render the landlord liable for whatever mesne profits the tenant had
to pay the stranger.69 This possibility did not necessitate interpleader,
because it was only theoretical. In view of the close relations between
landlord and tenants in England, the social odium attaching to a
landowner who failed to defend his tenant's possession against an
outsider would have been so great that it is safe to assume* that the
danger of any such eventuality was not worth considering. Therefore,
the landlord and tenant cases should have been of no authority what-
ever for denying interpleader in other situations.
Nevertheless, they are constantly cited as analogous in cases where
the applicant is under an entirely' different sort of relation to one of the
claimants. For example, a buyer is not allowed to interplead his vendor
and an adverse claimant to the chattel for want of privity.70  Yet he
cannot vouch in the vendor to defend the title, and furthermore,
whereas the tenant must pay rent to a landlord with a bad title up to the
time of eviction, a buyer is not obliged to take or keep a chattel which
the seller does not own. The seller impliedly warrants his title, and it is
absurd for the law to throw the burden of defending it upon the
buyer.
The privity doctrine appears at its worst in the case of the bailee,
where it was first laid down by'Brougham and Cottenham. No person
was more frequently subjected to double vexation through disputes of
The landlord might make a claim for rent before the eviction, but the tenant
could set-off whatever mesne profits he had to pay the stranger for the same
period. See note 69.
' Pungey v. Angove (1794, Ch.) 2 Ves. Jr. 303, 310.
See notes ii, 13 supra.
'Dungey v. Angove, supra.I'Slaney v. Sidney (845, Exch.) 14 M. & W. 8oo; Ames, 12, note.
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title, except possibly the sheriff, and it is significant that Parliament
allowed the sheriff to have interpleader in the very year, 1831,
7" that
the Chancellor first denied it to the bailee. It is also significant that
the law courts had already declared that the bailee was entitled to
interpleader in equity, and that text-books on Bailments have gone on
declaring this, following Kent, not wisely but too well, in oblivion of the
cases decided since he wrote.
7 2  What they say is justice, though it
is not the law. Warehousemen are not in the business of guaranteeing
title to the goods deposited with them and have no facilities for
making investigation into the ownership of a bailor. They take the
goods without inquiry in the speed of daily business, and then learn
afterwards of a dispute between the bailor and some third person. We
have already seen that the bailee may have interpleader if the dispute
arose out of an alleged assignment by the bailor.
73  Privity exists
there, since one claim is derived from the other, but not if the other
claimant alleges that the bailor stole the chattel before bailing it. The
distinction, whether the dispute of title arose before or after the bail-
ment, is immaterial under the test of mutual exclusiveness. Which-
ever claimant is owner ought to have the chattel from the bailee, and
he ought not to be liable to the other. Unlike the tenant, he is not
estopped to deny the title of the person with whom he contracted.
74
And there is no unfairness in forcing the bailor to fight out his title
himself in the second stage of the interpleader, whether the other claim
is derivative or paramount. The bailor may rest on his possession as
prima facie title, just as if the outsider were suing at law.
75  On the
privity test, however, the distinction between a derivative and a para-
mount claim becomes all-important, although the bailee is equally free
from fault, equally unconcerned in the dispute, and as frequently
troubled by a paramount claimant as by an alleged assignee. The
result of Cra.wshay v. Thornton 76 was nicely devised to prevent inter-
pleader in the very situation where it was most needed.
71 1 & 2 WM. IV, c. 58, sec. 6. Similar statutes are common in this country.
"Wilson v. Anderton (183o, K. B.) i B. &. Ad. 45o, 456, per Tenterden, C. J.;
2 Parsons, Contracts (8th ed. 1893) 216; Schouler, Bailments (3d ed. 1897) sec.
i18; Van Zile, Bailinents (2d ed. i9o8) sec. 53; see 2 Kent, Commentaries, *566,
before Crawshay v. Thornton,.
' Note 6, supra.
" The bailee, if sued by the bailor, may set up the jus tertii by authority of the
outside claimant. Biddle v. Bond (1865, Q. B.) 6 B. & S. 225; Ogle v. Atkinson
(1814, Exch. Ch.) 5 Taunt. 759. This protects the bailee even in the case of no
privity, but only if the claimant is willing to come in and become the real defen-
dant. His failure to come in is not attended with penalties, like that of the
landlord. He may bring trover against the bailee (Wilson v. Anderton, supra)
who is thus liable to double vexation and perhaps a double recovery.
" Note 63, last sentence; Maclennan, op. cit., 176, 177, citing other cases.
'Supra; for other bailee cases, usually denying relief in the absence of
privity, First National Bank v. Bininger (1875) 26 N. J. Eq. 345; Ames, 27, note;
1O L. R. A. (N. s.) 756, note.
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It is therefore very important to abolish the privity test altogether.
And where it is not abolished, it is necessary to define it accurately to
prevent its being used for indiscriminate denial of interpleader. Such
a definition would have permitted relief in Crawshay v. Thornton
itself and in many other cases where it has been denied.
An examination of the definitions of privity already given shows
the need of more precision in order to make the conception cover all
the cases. First, if the courts say that one claim must be derived from
the other, this covers the assignee situation, but not that where the
claimants are two assignees, each alleging a superior right.77 Hence,
the definition must be widened at least to recognize, as Pomeroy and
Maclennan do,78 that interpleader will be granted when both claims are
derived "from a common source," even though one is not derived from
the other, but is wholly antagonistic to it. What do they mean by
"common source"? In the case of the two assignees, both derive
from a common person, but that is not a decisive factor. Most adverse
claimants in cases where interpleader is denied would trace title to the
same individual if they went far enough back. For example, if the
specific legatee of a chattel bails it, the bailee cannot interplead the
bailor and the next-of-kin who contests the will, -though 'both derive
title from a common person, the decedent. The trouble is that neither
the decedent nor the next-of-kin had anything -to do with the bailment.
Again, if one claimant sells a chattel to the other and then wrongfully
bails it, the bailee cannot interplead although the buyer plainly derives
title from the seller, because the buyer does not claim through the
bailment. In such situations, privity means that the common person
must have been the owner of the obligation to which the applicant is
subject and whose ownership is in dispute. "Common source" involves,
not so much common person, as common obligation.7 9
This interpretation of Pomeroy's second requirement becomes still
more solidly established when we try to fit into it that important group
of interpleader cases so constantly emphasized in this article, the finder
and advowson cases at common law, the boarding-house case, the tax
cases of bailees, etc. is this: Are both claims against the applicant
his dilemma. 0 Here the claimants have no connection with each other.
They do not derive title from one another or from any common person.
The only test which will apply 'both to these cases and to the relational
cases of bailees, etc. is this; Are both claims against the applicant
derived from the same obligation?
' See note 6, supra.
,' See notes 25 and 49 supra; 91 Am. St. Rep. 6oo, note.
r' This interpretation of privity accords with Story (note 47, supra) and with
the early cases, which do not emphasize connection between the claims, but the
existence of an obligation from the applicant to C1, to which C must not
be a stranger. Dungey v. Angove and Crawshay v. Thornton are examples.
' See notes 7, 8, 9, 10, 35, supra.
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To put the same point in another form. Two sharply marked types
of interpleader have been obvious from the days of the Year Books.
(i) Cases based on the finder analogy, where the applicant is liable on
an obligation without knowing who is at the other end of it, and he
brings interpleader to find out the obligee. Each claimant professes to
be that obligee. Here all talk of connection or derivation among the
claims is meaningless. Privity was not mentioned at common law.
Either we should say that privity has no place in these cases, or better
yet, that the real meaning of privity must be wide enough to cover them.
Certainly Pomeroy's second requirement must be made that wide, and
the only common source permissible here is that both claims should be
derived from substantially the same obligation. (2) Cases based
on the bailment analogy, in which the applicant started with an
obligation to a definite person, and wants to know whether that person
still owns it or whether he has passed it along to some one else. Here,
too, the broad test applies, but in this type every one who claims
through this same original obligation must derive his title from the
original owner of the obligation, and a connection between the claimants
results which did not exist in the other type. This connection is, how-
ever, an incidental matter; the vital question under Pomeroy's second
requirement, so long as we are unwilling -to abolish it, is the same in
both types of interpleader. And it would be well if privity could be
thus defined to mean merely derivation from a substantially common
obligation.81  It seems feasible to obtain thus much from the courts
in view of the authorities. Eventually, they may throw privity over-
board and adopt the test of mutual exclusiveness.
The most conspicuous example of the beneficial effects of an accurate
definition of privity is Crawshay v. Thornton
8 2 itself, where Lord
Cottenham denied interpleader to a warehouseman with whom iron had
been deposited by Raikes. The claimants were a pledgee under
Raikes, and Daniloff, who alleged that Raikes was only an agent and
he was the true owner as undisclosed principal. The Chancellor held
that there was no privity. Yet both claimants got their rights against
the bailee through the same person, Raikes, and through the same
obligation, the bailment, which originally ran to Raikes as obligee.
Indeed both offered to pay the warehousemen's charges. Even if
Raikes was only an agent, his principal had to recognize the bailment
as a valid transaction and not as a wrongful act outside the agent's
powers. He had to deposit the iron somewhere. He could not carry it
around in his pockets. Consequently the bailee should have had inter-
pleader, just as if the claimants were two assignees from Raikes.
' This will reach the same result as Pomeroy's first test if the res is a debt or
duty, but not necessarily if it is the same thing, since the applicant may owe
different obligations with respect to that to the two claimants. See the discus-
sion of First National Bank v. Bininger, infra.
2 Supra.
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The existence of privity in that case will 'become more clear by
contrast with First National Bank v. Bininger.8 3 The depositary of
bonds under a suretyship transaction was denied interpleader against a
creditor of the bailor and the bailor's wife, who alleged that the bonds
belonged to her and were taken and deposited without her consent.
Here only the mutual exclusiveness test would permit relief, for there
was no privity under any definition. The wife did not claim through
the bailment, but asserted it was a wrong to her and that her husband
was wholly unauthorized to deposit the bonds in this transaction.
This case shows that the same obligation test of privity does not
always concide with Pomeroy's first requirement of same thing, debt, or
duty, though it usually would. Here the parties claim the same bonds,
but through different obligations.
The advantage of the broad interpretation of Pomeroy's second test
is clearly shown in recent cases. In Fogg v. Goode 84 the maker of a
note for the price of goods wished to interplead the executor of his obli-
gee and the surviving partner, who claimed that the debt belonged to the
firm. Here there was privity in the broad sense, because both claimed
through the obligation, the executor as legal owner and the partner as
equitable owner, of the note. Yet relief was denied, on the narrow
view of what the Florida court admits to be a "highly technical require-
"ment"; privity is said to be absent because the partner claims
adversely to the executrix. Fortunately other courts have been more
liberal, and several recent cases have granted interpleader where
any insistence on connection between the claimants might easily have
led to a similar refusal of relief. Thus a bank which had collected a
note from the indorser interpleaded the owner of the note and the
indorser, who tried to get the money back on the ground that it had been
paid under mistake.8 5 Here is it difficult to find privity even in the
broad sense, but the claims are mutually exclusive. A corporation after
the death of a stockholder interpleaded the legatee of the -stock and
the purchaser at a sale conducted on behalf of the guardian of the
decedent to pay the guardianship expenses.16 .A bank interpleaded the
depositor, an American citizen, and the Alien Property Custodian, who
contended that. the beneficial ownership of the deposit was in an alien
enemy. 7 The last two cases have privity in the broad sense, since
both parties claim through the same obligation, 'that of the corporation
to the dead shareholder or of the bank to the nominal depositor.
Similarly relief ought to be granted in the numerous cases where an
Supra note 76.
8, (igig, Fla.) 82 So. 614. Cortra. Beebe v. Mead, infra p. 840, note io.
"Roberts v. U. S. Trust Co. (1919) 234 Mass. 224, 125 N. E. 185." Thomas Key Woolen Mill Co. v. Sprague (1919, D. Ore.) 259 Fed. 338.
" American National Exchange Bank v. Palmer (1919, S. D. N. Y.) 256 Fed.
68o; but see American National Exchangc Bank v. Garvan (April 7, 1921,
C. C. A. 2d) not yet reported; cf. Kahn v. Garvan (192o, S. D. N. Y.) 263
Fed. gog.
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instrument payable to X is deposited with a bank for collection and the
proceeds are claimed by two persons, one asserting that X was owner
and the other that X was his agent. Though the claims are adverse to
each other, both are through X -and through the deposit for collection,
which must be recognized as rightful, since an agent can and ought to
collect an instrument when it matures.
88 Other recent liberal cases on
the bailment analogy are given below.
9
A very interesting case on the finder analogy is Packard v. Stevens.
90
A contractor made separate agreements with two sub-contractors to
fill in an island to a uniform level at so much per cubic yard. When
the -work was finished the total of the estimates of sub-contractors
exceeded by a large number of cubic yards the actual volume filled in.
They had begun work on opposite sides of the island and the difficulty
arose when they met, each insisting that material pumped in by him
had overflowed to the other side of the dividing line. Assume that
the total filling was a million cubic yards, the price ten cents a yard,
and each claimant estimated his work as six hundred thousand yards.
Thus, the applicant owed only $ioo,ooo, and was subject to claims
aggregating $12o,ooo. Interpleader was properly granted, for the
partial overlapping of the claims constituted mutual exclusiveness,
although somewhat different from the usual case. Ordinarily, the two
claims completely overlap, so that if one is right, the other must be
wholly wrong. Here neither claim was wholly wrong, but both could
not be wholly right. Each claim was sound up to $4o,ooo. Thus,
$8o,ooo of the applicant's liability was undisputed, but the remaining
$20,000 might rightfully belong all to one claimant, or partly to each.
The claims were mutually exclusive to this extent. Or else it can
be said that interpleader was necessary to relieve the applicant from the
excess of $i2o,ooo over $ioo,ooo, since this excess was admittedly not
due. In other words, it it not essential that any claim or claims shall
be wholly Wrong, so long as a part of the aggregate claims must be
wrong. Some overlapping is essential. The same need for inter-
pleader exists when a municipality empowered to issue bonds to a
certain amount issues a larger amount, so that some bonds must be
invalid, but no one knows which;91 or when sub-contractors claim
mechanics' liens aggregating more than the amount of the main
contract.92
"Platte Valley Bank v. National Live Stock Bank (1895) 155 Ill. 250, 40 N. E.
621; contra, Third National Bank v. Skillings Lumber Co. (1882) 132 Mass. 410.
See the cases collected in IO L. R. A. (N. s.) 756, note.
' Sherman v. Shubert supra note 38; Caverly v. Small, supra note 6, semble;
Schmidt v. Pittsburgh, supra note 6; Bathgate v. Echange (1918) igg Mo. App.
583, 205 S. W. 875; Baber v. Houston, supra note 7; Repetto sr. Raggio (I919)
201 Mo. App. 628, 213 S. W. 525.
" (1899, Ch.) 58 N. J. Eq. 489, 46 Atl. 250.
"Saratoga v. Deyoe (1879) 77 N. Y. 219 (as bill of peace).
"School District v. Weston (1875) 31 Mich. 85.
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It would have been easy for the court which decided the Bininger
Case 3 to deny relief in Packard v. Stevens"° on'the ground that privity
in the narrow sense was lacking, because there was no connection
between the claimants. The same objection would exist to the finder
case at common law. It is also questionable whether privity exists in
any sense 5 or whether Pomeroy's test of "same debt, duty, or thing" is
satisfied, since the claims arise from distinct contracts. In substance,
however, there is only one obligation, to pay each man for the work he
has done. The same difficulty arises in the broker cases, where each
claims a commission under a distinct contract.9 6 All these cases show
the advantage of avoiding this extremely technical discussion by
discarding the requirements of identity and privity altogether.
Is this judicial abolition of privity possible? Or ought the courts
to adopt the attitude of Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet in the Bininger
Case?
97
"If this was a case of first impression, no difficulty Would be found
in declaring it fell clearly within the purposes designed to be accom-
plished in the establishment of a court of equity. But the rule . . . is
too firmly established to be changed by anything short, of legislative
power. I cannot break through a rule so firmly established as to be,in the judgment of Judge Story,98 no longer open to discussion, even
if it was clear a better could be invented. Stability in legal rules is
more important than that they should accomplish complete justice in
every case."
The doctrine of stare decisis applies to judicial principles on which
men rely in acquiring property or conducting their affairs. 99 If a
court has held municipal bonds to be valid, and purchases have been
made accordingly, a decision that they are void will be highly unjust.,
If a certain course of dealing has been held not to be tortious or
criminal, men who subsequently so act, supposing their conduct to be
innocent, ought not to be rendered wrongdoers by an overruling of the
"Note 76, supra.
" Note go, supra.
"Privity is said not to exist in these cases by notes in (904) 17 H. v. L. REV.
489, and (1909) 9 COL. L. REV. 252. The latter note is afn able exposition of the
division of interpleader cases into two types, which was worked out independently
by the writer of this article.
"See note 7, .rupra (the broker eases denying relief)." 0x875) 26 N. J. Eq. 345, 349.
"See note 52, supra and my comment in the text.
"I am a strong believer in applying the doctrine of-stare decisis whenever
prior decisions, in any degree, either affect property rights or lay down principles
which have become accepted rules of property; but here no such rights or prin-
ciples .are involved." Moschzisker, J., dissenting in Luzerne v. Morgan (i9i9)
263 Pa. 458, 1o7 Atl. 17, 39.1 Gelpcke v. Dubuque (1864, U. S.) i Wall. 175.
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established cases. But if interpleader is given in a situation where it
used to be denied for lack of privity, who suffers? It cannot be
seriously contended that the claimants in the Bininger Case acted and
acquired rights in reliance on the rule of Crawshay v. Thornton. The
fact that it was impossible on existing authorities to interplead them
(if they thought of it at all) would not have the slightest influence on
their conduct. And the abolition of the doctrine of privity is not like
a change in the law of property or negligence. It does not add to the
real rights of the parties or subtract from them. It merely moulds
the machinery by which rights are to be enforced so as to lessen
expense, delay, and the possibility of an unjust double recovery.
Consequently, it is to be hoped that many judges in their treatment of
the traditional limitations on interpleader will imitate, not the caution
of Van Fleet, but the courage of Christiancy2 and Doe.8 Stare decisis
is out of place in procedural reform.
There are many signs that the process of liberalization is already well
under way. Many cases get around Pomeroy's four requirements by
showing great readiness to find an independent ground of equitable
jurisdiction on which to base a bill in the nature of interpleader, which
is free from technical liimitations.4 Often this ground is not stated,
and it is hard to discover any except multiplicity, which is not far
removed from double vexation and nothing more.5 A skilful pleader
can usually work out some ground. Other cases tacitly or even
expressly discard privity.
Meanwhile, much has been accomplished by legislation. Privity has
been wholly abolished in England,7 Canada,8 California, and the other
states following its Code (Idaho, Montana, Utah). 9 Many other
states have statutes regulating interpleader, especially in law suits,
which do not say anything about privity one way or the other. There
is some judicial tendency to regard privity as abolished by these statutes,
while other decisions treat them as merely procedural like the English
' See note 92, supra, and the end of this article.
'See note 15, supra.
'Ames, 46, note; Guaranteed State Bank v. D'Yarmett (1917, Okla.) I69 Pac.
639 (cancellation) ; Sherman v. Shubert, supra note 13 (account).
'Aleck v. Jackson (1892, Ch.) 49 N. J. Eq. 5o7, 23 Atl. 76o; Carter v. Cryer
(5904, Ch.) 68 N. J. Eq. 24, 59 At. 233.
'Baber v. Houston, supra note 7, at p. 161: "The rule has been frequently
relaxed;" Sewanee v. Leonard (917) 139 Tenn. 648, 651, 202 S. W. 928, semble:
"Waiving the old rule of privity. . . which is now said to be somewhat relaxed."
For tacit relaxing, see cases in notes 85-89, supra.
In re Mersey Docks [1899, C. A.] i Q. B. 546; Maclennan, 35o.
'See Maclennan, Appendix, for the various provinces..
Calif. Code Civ. Pro. sec. 386; 4 Pomeroy, 3470, note, objects to the abolition
of identity, but mutual exclusiveness would doubtless still be required. At
some future time I hope to review the decisions construing American inter-
pleader statutes.
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Act of 1831.10 Privity has frequently been abolished in the situations
where it caused the worst injustice. Thus the sheriff has been given
relief in several jurisdictions.11 Massachusetts and New York have
allowed apparently unlimited interpleader to some banks.12  And the
kinds of bailees who most need interpleader now have it under the
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act 3 and Uniform Bills of Lading Act."
It is to be hoped that judges in the many states which have adopted
these two statutes will come to regard them as enunciations of a broad
commercial principle that bailees should have relief regardless of
privity, and will extend this statutory principle, by analogy, to bailees
and other persons not within the Acts, just as they would extend a
principle laid down by a judge in a decision to other situations not
before that judge. In this instance everyone agrees that the legislative
principle of broad relief is far better than the judicial principle of
privity, and far more suitable to apply to new sets of facts.'5
INTEREST
The two remaining requirements of Pomeroy require only brief
mention. The objections to relief for a person who is subject to real
double vexation, but has some interest in the controversy, are three-
fold. (I) If he is interested, he ought not to withdraw, but should
contest the various claims. This is souud if he has an interest which
is of as much importance in the controversy as the obligation out of
which the double vexation arises. For example, if he denies the claims
"See notes '1-13, supra, and Maclennan for the statutes in 1901. Conn. Gen.
St. 1918, sec. 6055 apparently abolishes privity; Union Trust Co. v. Stamford
Trust Co. (I899) 72 Conn. 86, 43 Atl. 555. Mass. Gen. Laws, 19O2, ch. 173, sec. 37,
is skid not to abolish any requirements, by Gonia v. O'Brion (i916) 223 Mass.
i77, 178, II N. E. 787, but liberal results are reached by Underwood v. Coolidge
(igig) 232 Mass. 124, 122 N. E. 27o, and see note 85, supra. The construction
of N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. sec. 82o is uncertain. It is said not -to be recognized
by the statute in Crane v. McDonald (i8gc) 118 N. Y. 648, 23 N. E. 991; but
the statute is said merely to carry over equitable interpleader into the law
courts in Pouch v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1912) 2o4 N. Y. 281, 284, 97 N. E. 73I.
In Beebe v. Mead (i9o5) ioi App. Div. 3o; 92 N. Y. Supp. 51, a bailee was
relieved without privity.
See Maclennan.
'Mass. Acts i9o8, ch. 59o, sec. 50 (savings banks) ; Phillips v. Suffolk (1914)
219 Mass. 597, io7 N. E. 4oi; N. Y. Banking Laws, sec. i99 (tryst companies);
Evans v. Guaranty Trust Co. (1919) 187 App. Div. 3o, 175 N. Y. Supp. i18.
"Sec. 17. This act is adopted in 39 states. N. I. Title Co. v. Rector (19IO) 76
N. J. Eq. 587, 75 At. 931, reversing (i9o9, Ch.) 75 N. J.,Eq. 423, 72 Atl. 968;
Manhattan v. Benguiat (1913) I55 App. Div. 196, 139 N. Y. Supp. 1073; Rosen-
berg v. Viane (1919, Sup. Ct) IO5 Misc. 215, 179 N. Y. Supp. 447.
" Sec. 20. This -act is adopted in 2o states.
"On the extension of statutory principles by analogy, see Roscoe Pound,
Common Law and Legislation (i9O8) 21 HARv. L. REv. 383; Donald E. Dunbar,
Statutory Principles in the Common Law (1917) 30 id. 742; Chafee, Cases on
Vegotiable Instruments (I920) 33, note.
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altogether, this dispute is as serious as that between the claimants,
and he cannot very well put the res into court and retire.
18 Even so,
the alternative of two suits at law may mean a double recovery. 
The
appropriate solution is a three-cornered suit in equity, not interpleader
because the obligor stays in, but an analogy in the form of a bill 
of
peace. 17 On the other hand, if the obligor disputes a small part of 
one
or both claims or has a lien or set-off, his interest is small in compari-
son with the double vexation, and he shbuld be allowed to put the 
full
amount claimed in court and retire. (2) Here we must deal with 
a
second objection, that there is no way to adjudicate his small claim 
in
either stage of the interpleader suit. This is true enough if the histor-
ical form of the proceeding is rigidly maintained, but it is entirely
practicable to adapt it to deal with the applicant's claim. For example,
if A claims a bailee's lien, which is recognized by C. but not by C2, the
first stage can allow interpleader and direct A to put the chattel in
court; the second stage will determine which claimant is entitled to it,
and if C, wins, A's claim will be voluntarily discharged; but if C2 wins,
the proceeding can easily be extended into a third stage, in which 
he
and A can contest the validity of the alleged lien. There is no reason
in the nature of things why interpleader should be limited to two
stages. Another solution is to allow the applicant to participate in the
second stage, and fight out his claim in a three-cornered suit. It is
not absolutely essential that he withdraw at 
the end of the first stage,i
s
and equity is used to multi-sided suits. It has merely an historical
prejudice against them in the special case of interpleader, which ought
to be overcome. Indeed, where there are more than two claimants, the
second stage is always triangular or polygonal. There is no fatal
objection to considering the applicant as one of three claimants to- the
res. In a recent bill in the nature of interpleader, where'the owner-
ship of a bank deposit was disputed between several persons and the
bank itself claimed an interest for the repayment of loans made by it,
the bank was allowed to put the deposit into court, and then participate
in the polygonal contest as to its distribution.' Here there was an
independent ground of equitable jurisdiction, in addition to multiple
vexation to the bank, but the machinery thus used is equally applicable
and equally needed without that ground, inasmuch as the remedy at
law is clearly inadequate. In another bill in the nature of inter-
pleader, where the applicant disputed the amount of his obligation,
" Galpin v. Chicago (1915) 269 Ill. 27, iog N. E. 713; Maxim v. Shotwell
(192o, Mich.) 176 N. W. 414; Goggin v. Mutual (1919, Mo. App.) 213 S. W.
522.
1TMcHenry v. Hazard (1871) 45 N. Y. 580.
In George v. Pilcher (1877, Va.) 28 Gratt. 299, 305, a tenant interpleading
rival heirs of his lessor was allowed to pay accrued rents into court, but was
retained in the suit subject to the order to pay subsequent instalments of rent
in as they became due.
*"Sherman v. Shubert (1917, S. D. N. Y.) 238 Fed. 225. The independent
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this dispute was allowed to be determined in a preliminary stage of the
proceedings; the amount thus fixed was then paid into court by the
applicant, who withdrew and left the claimants to fight out its owner-
ship.20 Why should the existence of some independent ground be a
prerequisite to such a just solution? (3) It will be objected that an
interested applicant ought not to be given interpleader with its tradi-
tional benefits in the form of costs, counsel fees, remission of interest,
etc.,21 if he participates in the claims to the res. The answer is, give
him interpleader without those benefits. Equity has no hard and fast
rules as to costs in other suits; it can adjust them according to the
merits of the parties and other facts. Why should it not have the
same flexibility in interpleader?22
Consequently, the existence of some interest in the applicant should
not deprive equity of jurisdiction to grant interpleader, but should
merely go to the exercisp of jurisdiction, and should not bar relief in
cases where there is genuine double vexation with no adequate remedy
at law.
INDEPENDENT LIABILITY
In several cases where the applicant was under an obligation to C1
and C2 did not claim through it, the courts have denied relief both for
want of privity and because A was said to be under an independent
liability to C1, which would not be settled by the second stage of inter-
pleader. In fact, no such independent liability arose out of the obliga-
tion, except in the landlord and tenant cases, for if C2 was justly
entitled to the res the obligation to C1 would be discharged. However,
such additional liability might conceivably be created by estoppel or
some other ground, but this would be unusual. 2 In Crawshay v.
Thornton;' Cottenham was much too eager in finding that estoppel
existed. Assume there is a true possibility of independent liability
of a bailee to C1, the pledgee under the bailor, because of estoppel,
in addition to the bailee's liability to deliver the disputed chattel
to the rightful owner. It is said that relief ought to be denied
because an adjudication of ownership in C2 will not conclude the
controversy, and because the applicant does not stand indifferent
"Aleck v. Jackson (1892, Ch.) 49 N. J. Eq. 5o7, 23 4t6. 760. The independent
ground was cloud on title.
'The applicant was ordered to pay part of the costs because of his interest,
in Jacobson v. Blackhurst (1862, Md.) 2 Johns & H. 486; Christian v. Ins. Co.
(895) 62 Mo. App. 35.
' For cases giving relief despite interest, see Ames, 13, note, 2d par.; i5, note.
"In Lindsey v. Barron (1848) 6 C. B. 291, a bailee of chattels had pledged
them to C2; they were also claimed by the bailor. Interpleader was denied,
because even though in the second stage C: might win for want of power in A
to pledge, A might still be under an independent liability to the pledgee on an
implied warranty of his authority to pledge.
" (x837, Ch.) 2 Myl. & C. i; the bailee did not represent that the pledgee was
owner, but merely that he had whatever rights the bailor, Raikes, possessed; the
pledgee did not act in reliance upon any representation, since the money had
already been advanced.
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between the claimants. It is true that a two-stage proceeding will not
determine that the bailee is entirely free from liability to either claim-
ant, but 'here again as in the interest cases, equity need not limit the
proceeding to two stages. At the end of the first stage, the bailee can
put the chattel into court and withdraw; in the second stage the owner-
ship of the chattel will be settled between the claimants. If C, wins,
everything is over; for C. cannot also pursue the bailee on an inde-
pendent liability. On the other hand, if C2 wins, the independent
liability of A to C. can be fought out between them in a third stage,
and complete justice will be done. The applicant will thus be relieved
from a real danger of double vexation and double liability with respect
to the ownership of the chattel, and in many cases the independent
claim,will never need to be litigated. Costs can be partly thrown on A
in view of his special situation. The arguments against this method
are (i) the hardship to C, of two contests, first with C2 in the second
stage, secondly with A in the third stage, whereas if 'he were allowed to
sue A at law, both of A's liabilities -would be determined in one contest;
but this must be set-off against the hardship to A of two actions at law
and a possible double recovery and weighed by the court in the balance
of convenience, so that jurisdiction will be exercised or not according
to circumstances; (2) the analogy of common-law interpleader, where
the applicant dropped out entirely after the first stage; but modem
courts should refuse to be so rigidly limited where justice is at stake.
The court should have discretion. Just because interpleader would
sometimes be ,unfair to the claimant who alleges the independent
liability, this does not make it always unfair, and when it is not so,
relief should be given to the applicant who is none the less doubly vexed
on the common claim, although there is a possible independent claim.
The wisdom of this flexible method is shown by the instances where
it has been used under modem statutes. In England under the Judica-
ture Act a warehouseman was allowed this relief despite a possible
liability to one claimant through estoppel,2 5 although the statute and
rules of court said nothing one way or the other about the old bar of
independent liability. The same result has been reached in New York
under the Warehouse Receipts Act,2 which is also silent on Pomeroy's
fourth requirement, and Alabama under its Code gave relief to an
insurance company which had gone so far as to give a check to one
claimant to insurance money, and would therefore have been denied
relief in a strict court.2 7  Consequently, all courts should find it possible
to dispense with this limitation without legislation,
"In re Mersey Docks, [I899, C. A.] i Q. B. 546. The terms of the English
court order furnish a valuable model for American interpleader legislation.
However, these provisions are still narrowly interlireted with respect to the tests
of same debt, duty, or thing, See note 46, supra.
'Rosenberg v. Viane, supra p. 840, note 13.
"Marsh v. Mutual (97) 2oo Ala. 438, 76 So. 370. Cf. National Security
Bank v. Batt (igi3) 225 Mass. 489, io2 N. E. 601; (19o4) x7 HRv. L. REV. 489.
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Our discussion of Pomeroy's four requirements results, therefore,
in the following conclusions. The first and second requirements should
be abolished and the test of mutual exclusiveness substituted. The
third and fourth requirements should remain only as considerations
affecting the exercise of equitable jurisdiction and no longer bar the
jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, these changes will make interpleader in many cases
very different from the smooth-sliding rigid common-law remedy, with
its automatic disposal of the applicant. It will be no longer a distinc-
tive branch of equity, but really only one species of a bill of peace, if
we extend that name to all suits where relief is asked from a multi-
plicity of actions at law without adequate possibility of justice in the
law courts. If the benefits of settling the matter by one proceeding in
equity outweigh the difficulties of combining numerous parties and
claims, then equity should act. Questions of fact can be referred to a
jury if the Coristitution so requires. The whole problem of inter-
pleader thus boils down to a question of multifariousness. 28
The history of interpleader exhibits one great leap forward when
the Chancellor threw overboard the limitations of the common-law
action and did not require that the claim should be in detinue or quare
impedit, but granted relief in many situations wholly uncontemplated
by the common law. Early in the nineteenth century. this progress
was suddenly checked. The Court, which had &hanged a rigid
mediaeval remedy into a flexible instrument of justice, set about
devising new limitations of its own. The time has now arrived for
a second leap forward. Equity judges can solve many of the perplexing
tangles growing out of our complex modern, commercial life if they
will only adopt toward interpleader the same broad attitude which they
have used toward other equitable remedies, and take to heart the
warning given by an able judge in a liberal interpleader decision fifty
years ago :28
"There have been, occasionally, upon the bench, as well as at the
bar, minds of that peculiar cast, which always see more importance in
arbitrary signs, than in the thing signified; in the form and detail of
the mere scaffolding, than in the building it was intended to aid in
erecting; minds which take it for'granted that the whole law has been
exhausted in its application to the particular enumerated facts found in
the cases which have already arisen and been decided, and that no
remedy can be given in cases which may happen to lack some of the
facts enumerated in past cases, or to present new one.s; thus mistaking
what in their nature were but instances of the application of the
principle, for a restrictive definition of the entire principle itself."
School District v. Weston (1875) $ i Mich. 85, 96.
2School District v. Weston, at p. 95, per Christiancy, J.
